Introduction
Montenegro, the smallest of the Balkan countries, is also the latest one (if partially recognised former province of Kosovo is excluded) to (re)gain independence Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 36 (2017) DOI: 10.1515 DOI: 10. /lfpr-2017 on 21 May 2006. It is situated in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula and has a 300-km long Adriatic coast. Its geographic position makes it more interesting to regional and global powers than its size would tell.
Dealing with Montenegrin foreign policy faces certain obstacles and challenges. The major one is the fact that Montenegro is a young country and, although it did have its foreign secretary during the Yugoslav era, it could not be analysed separately from the federation. Only since 1997 when part of Montenegrin leadership decided to change its political direction away from (the leader of rump Yugoslavia) Slobodan Milosevic, it did start to formulate foreign policy of its own. Consequently, as Montenegro was the smallest and amongst the least developed parts of Yugoslavia, it lagged behind the most important scientific and cultural centres of the country, such as Belgrade, and opened its first university only in 1974, with its first Faculty of Political Science founded only in 2006, merely three weeks before the independence referendum. Thus, as its political science, including the study of foreign policy and international relations, is only emerging and is not fully developed on a par with Serbia or Croatia, there is much smaller amount of books and articles on various fields of the political science. Any monograph or schoolbook on the foreign policy of Montenegro has not been published yet. The only exception in regard of writing of academic texts on foreign policy of Montenegro is the book chapters by Jelena Dzankic in 'The foreign policies of Post-Yugoslav States: from Yugoslavia to Europe' (London: Palgrave, 2014, pp. 173-197) and 'Europe and the post-Yugoslav space' (London: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 109-133) , the second one focusing on relations with the European Union. She also acknowledges virtual non-existence of academic studies dealing with Montenegro's foreign policy. 1 There are, however, some topics of political science studies that are related to foreign policy and may be valuable for a researcher. One of them is party and electoral system of Montenegro. There are various books and articles analysing Montenegrin transition and development of its party and electoral system, and also its constitutional law. Particularly useful are papers by Srdjan Darmanovic, such as 'Montenegro: Dilemmas of a Small Republic ' (2003) , 'Montenegro: a miracle in the Balkans ' (2007) and, more recently, 'The never-boring Balkans: the elections of 2016', all of them are published in Journal of Democracy. Darmanovic deals mostly with the political dynamics and changes from inside, partly covering also their relations with foreign policy. Montenegrin political system remains of interest for other political scientists, particularly because of its very interesting characteristicMontenegro remains, to date, the only European country that have never witnessed 1 'From Creeping to Sprinting: foreign policy of Montenegro' in Foreign Policies of the post-Yugoslav States, ed. by S. Keil and B. Stahl (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 194. in electoral campaigns for local elections. Also, Montenegrin Government wants to present Montenegro as a very old nation (which is why the independence from 2006 is 'regained') and studying Montenegrin history as an independent nation is strongly encouraged. The most comprehensive history of Montenegrin diplomacy is 'Istorija diplomatije Crne Gore' ('History of Diplomacy of Montenegro', 2009) by Radoslav Raspopovic, dealing with the period between 1711 (the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Russian Empire) and 1918 (forceful annexation of Montenegro by Serbia at the end of the World War I (WWI)). There are also books on relations of Montenegro with the Great Powers -such as 'Crna Gora i velike sile' ('Montenegro and the Great Powers ', 2006 , by Zivko Andrijasevic and Serbo Rastoder) -and a series of books on relations of Montenegro (in the 19th and the early 20th centuries) with particular countries -Russia, Frances, the United States, Bulgaria and so on. Rastoder and Andrijasevic also served as editors to the first Historic Lexicon of Montenegro, published in five volumes in 2006, that also covers many topics from history of diplomacy. However, none of these books was written by a political scientist, and the approach is mostly historical.
These books and articles can be helpful in researching and analysing certain aspects of Montenegrin foreign policy, but as it was previously mentioned, there is still a remarkably small amount of texts on contemporary foreign policy of Montenegro.
In this paper, the foreign relations of Montenegro after it regained independence will be analysed. Foreign relations of a small and newly founded country that, whilst not war-torn like some of its neighbours, still remains divided ethnically, religiously and also politically on many issues will be taken in concern, particularly, the evolution of its foreign policy, from cordial and strong relations with Russia into country that, at least regarding its current government policies, sees Russia as its nemesis, whilst, at the same time, it became the first country that NATO bombarded to later on become its member. Different fields of its foreign relations will be compared, particularly emphasising economic and trade relations that may be (and usually are) contradictory to its political rhetoric. Certain expectations and perspectives, particularly regarding its NATO membership, will be given.
First of all, some historical facts need to be mentioned. In late 18th century, Montenegro became the first South Slavic country to regain de facto independence (after fall under the Ottoman Empire in 15th century), which was recognised in 1878 on the Congress of Berlin. Although Montenegro supported the Entente in the WWI, it was forcefully annexed to Serbia in 1918 and then became part of the unitary Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It recovered its statehood in 1943 when it was proclaimed one of equal future republics of the socialist Yugoslavia. During the era of Yugoslav socialist leader, Josip Broz Tito, Montenegro recorded huge economic and social development, as Tito used geopolitical position of his country to achieve relative prosperity through balancing between the two Cold War blocs. However, prosperous days were over in 1980s when after Tito's death nationalism rose, particularly in two largest republics, Serbia and Croatia. When in 1990 on the first multiparty elections nationalists prevailed all over the country, elections in Montenegro were won by supporters of Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, who decided to remain in union with Serbia. Serbia and Montenegro, apart from Bulgaria, were only former socialist countries to have former communists winning the first multiparty elections. 4 The two republics proclaimed the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 27 April 1992, but it was not recognised by the international community. Furthermore, Montenegro followed Serbia into isolation from international community, because of the involvement in Balkan wars. It was only in 1997 that Montenegrin Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, turned his back to Milosevic, and became a pillar of struggle against his regime. Djukanovic narrowly won the second round of presidential elections on 19 October 1997, and it was a turning point in Montenegrin history because for the first time there was openly anti-Milosevic and pro-Western politician in that office.
5 It was also the first time that the EU membership for Montenegro became official policy of Montenegrin government. Finally, Milosevic lost the elections on 24 September 2000 and, though trying to forge the results, was forced to resign on 5 October. The opposition forces that came to power in Serbia apparently supported the country's integration in the European Union. However, despite Milosevic -seen as the main obstacle for Montenegrin autonomy within the federation and its European integration -was gone, Montenegrin government sent an invitation to Serbian government to transform the federation into union of independent states. It was unacceptable for federal president Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian leaders, so the negotiation started on how the relations between Serbia and Montenegro should look like in the future. The European Union was heavily involved in these negotiations.
With strong involvement of Javier Solana, who was High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Montenegro was forced to sign the so-called Belgrade Agreement on 14 March 2002. By that agreement, on the one hand, Montenegro accepted not to seek independence through referendum for at least 3 years and, on the other hand, FRY turned into a loose state union with a new name -Serbia and Montenegro. It was obvious that Montenegrin society was divided on the issues of independence and that the European Union favoured some kind of union of Serbia and Montenegro, despite the right of Montenegro to secede, like the other former Yugoslav republics that were promptly recognised by then-European Community. Rational calculations rather than norms or moral duties explain better the European Union's insistence on keeping the State Union because the security interests of the EU member states dominated the political thinking of the EU policymakers. As Montenegrin government wanted to use the opportunity given by the Belgrade Agreement and to hold the referendum after moratorium passes, the European Union did not want to leave decision making to Balkan states this time, so it became a major player in the pre-referendum negotiations regarding conditions for organising it. Javier Solana was seen as a strong supporter of unity and creator of the Belgrade Agreement bringing the nickname Solania to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. On the other hand, the EU politicians knew that whilst they stopped Montenegro from secession in 2002, they, at the same time, accepted its right to hold a plebiscite on that topic in the future. Thus, the EU officials were heavily involved in search of the best model for the referendum. Finally, the EU proposition, unseen before in world referendum practice, 7 was accepted by both sides. Montenegro, according to that referendum law, would become independent if more than 55% of those who voted supported independence. The European Union wished to see clear majority in order to avoid further turmoil in case of a victory by a small margin. They were also afraid of possible influence of Montenegrin independence on position of Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although there could hardly be any comparison between the right of Montenegro and potential right of a smaller Bosnian entity to become independent. The other, bigger problem was Kosovo issue, at the time still unsolved. The international community reacted with resigned acceptance.
Clearly the European Union by imposing a 55% threshold on Montenegrin independence had hoped to preserve the State Union. Its main concern was the radicalisation of Serbian politics in the event of Serbia's potential loss of both Montenegro and Kosovo in such a short period. It also worried about the Montenegrin model being used by other potential breakaway groups in other European states (Basques or Catalans in Spain who followed with interest what was happening in Montenegro). This apprehension was not without justification -the presence of an unofficial Basque delegation was a personal matter of concern for Javier Solana, who had to deny that Montenegro had any similarities with the Spanish regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country.
Finally, Montenegro voted 55.5% for 'yes' option and the results, despite the unionist not accepting them, were internationally recognised. Javier Solana congratulated Montenegro and said the turnout of over 86% confirmed the legitimacy of the process. The EU commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, said that the European Union would put forward proposals for fresh talks with both Montenegro and Serbia. According to Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia became successor of the State Union and Montenegro had to apply to all organizations as a new member. Still, since the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiation started not long before the referendum and some of the talks were already made separately, there were not many problems for Montenegro to restart its integration process. Montenegro succeeded in regaining independence via a process that excluded the use of force even as a possibility.
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Montenegrin parliament declared independence officially on 3 June and international recognitions started on 8 June. Following Iceland, Switzerland and Russia, the European Union recognised Montenegrin independence on 12 June and individual members followed one by one the same day and during the week after it.
In dealing with the foreign policy of Montenegro in this paper, realistic approach will be taken. External relations are first of all interactions amongst independent states on grounds of interest, no matter whether the states are great powers or small (like Montenegro, roughly 30th smallest country in the world by area and population). Although historically, particularly, in 1914, when it entered the WWI (it was not attacked by Austria-Hungary, but because of brotherhood with Serbia), its leadership showed obvious idealism, the contemporary foreign policy has witnessed a huge change. Emotions and values are used mostly in order to achieve interest and restrained or overpowered if they are not in accordance with objectives. However, being a small and economically and militarily weak state, Montenegro shares the destiny of many other countries of the same size -its interests has to be harmonised with the interests of great powers with whom it wants to enter into integrations and alliances. These integrations are presented as unity of values but are actually seen as, first of all, the key for stability and security.
What Montenegrin Government showed in the previous two decades of decision making in its foreign policy is the triumph of rational choice over emotions. Despite the public opinion (partly created and supported by its own policy before the late 1990s) that favoured anti-Western, pro-Russian and proSerbian positions, after understanding that possibilities in following that course of action were mostly exhausted, the Government made a turn towards the West, facing internal pressure, division of the ruling party and (in January 1998) street riots. However, despite that, the line was followed that put Montenegro on the brink of internal conflict -during the NATO intervention in 1999, referendum in 2006, recognition of Kosovo in 2008, joining NATO in 2017 -everything in order to follow the foreign policy line considered the best for achieving long-term stability, security and development for Montenegro.
Tide of public opinion was, on many occasions, against the decisions of parliamentary majority. In the newest public survey did by CEDEM (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights) in June 2017, just days before formal Montenegrin entry into NATO, only 38.7% of Montenegrin public supported NATO membership, whilst 39.8% were against and 21.5% expressed no opinion on that issue. The same survey showed that 27.2% of the respondents think Montenegro should rely on the European Union in its foreign policy, but Russia received higher support (with 20.5%) than the United States (with 15.4%), despite the Government's policy that strongly favours the United States over Russia. 
Foreign policy and security priorities
After regaining independence, Montenegro started forming its diplomatic network and also adopting needed legislation and other documents in order to make a functioning foreign policy apparatus.
The most important document, although broadly put, 'The Foreign Policy Priorities of Montenegro', was formally adopted in November 2007.
The top priority of Montenegrin foreign policy is integration of Montenegro into the European Union and NATO.
11 Joining the European Union was already priority of the former State Union, but joining NATO could only become a goal after the independence because in Serbia there was no significant support for that. As mentioned before, society was (and still remains) divided on the issue, since Serbia and Montenegro were at war with NATO and some of the civil victims of the air raids were from Montenegro. The EU membership remains the most important goal, and there was always either a ministry or a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that deals exclusively with the country's EU integration process.
Second priority is promotion and advancement of neighbourly relations and regional cooperation. Amongst its neighbours, Montenegro counts not only the countries it share land border with -Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and now Kosovo, as well as Italy, which is just across the Adriatic sea -but also other former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia and Slovenia and other neighbours of former Yugoslavia -Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Austria. Thus, unlike Croatia, for example, Montenegro defines neighbourhood wider, signifying that primary goal of good neighbourly relations is not solving open issues with immediate neighbours but positioning in the wider region.
As the third priority, development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in international relations is set. This priority is then explained in detail, relating different countries and international organisations. Relations with leading EU members, such as Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy, were particularly emphasised, but other countries, including Central European, Scandinavian and Baltic, are also mentioned, as Montenegro believes that with small European countries, it can share experiences of working with small but efficient administrations. Countries seen as global powers, such as the United States, Russia and China, are also mentioned, before the countries of Mediterranean circle, amongst whom Turkey is outlined, and other world countries, such as countries with significant Montenegrin diaspora, Argentina and Australia. It is underlined that historic and cultural ties with Russia should help the development of relations on all fields -which looks ironic if we have in mind how bad political relations between the two are at the moment. Amongst the international organisations, most important are (after NATO and the European Union which are the top priority), the United Nations (UN), Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and World Trade Organization (WTO), in which Montenegro became a member in 2012.
As we see, the priorities are broadly put, and the fact that some of them are contradictory is overlooked, as it would be proved during the past decade. For example, it is almost impossible to continue NATO integration without damaging relations with Russia. Also, it is hard, if not impossible, to continue with good relations with all the neighbours in a very complex and divided region.
On the other hand, in another document, security priorities and challenges were set. Together with priorities that are common for every country (defending the country, protecting lives and property of its citizens, development of defence capacities, higher living standard of its citizens, etc.), there are some specific priorities: joining the European Union and NATO, supporting missions of OUN, the European Union, NATO and OSCE. Different threats to Montenegrin security are mentioned -from international, coming specifically from the Middle East, North Africa and Caucasus, to organised crime, which is one of the major problems in Montenegro, including weapon and drug smuggling, illegal immigration, human trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The main goal, membership in the European Union and NATO, is shared with Croatian foreign policy 1991-2013, but Montenegro fortunately did not have to focus on two other goals that Croatia had -achieving international recognition and territorial re-integration 13 because its independence was achieved peacefully. 
Montenegro and the EU integration
Soon after it regained independence, Montenegro started negotiations with the European Union on the SAA which it finally signed on 15 October 2007 in Luxembourg. It established association between the Communities and its member states on one side and Republic of Montenegro on the other.
14 At the moment, it appeared that Montenegrin officials were right since Serbia's negotiations came to halt as problems with cooperation with the Tribunal in Hague emerged. Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, expressed hope that the SAA with Montenegro would serve as an inspiration for the other countries of the region.
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Unlike NATO, the EU membership is supported by all political parties and large majority of Montenegrin citizens.
Montenegro applied for membership in the European Union on 15 December 2008 and handed the answers to questionnaire to assess the country's application to join the European Union on 9 December 2009. Other important, particularly psychologically important, event came up in between. On 30 November 2009, the European Council decided that citizens of Montenegro (and Serbia and Macedonia as well) could travel to Schengen zone countries without a visa. It was important step for the country that passed through international isolation to feel again closer to Europe. 16 This event was politically important for the mobility of the citizens of the three countries concerned, but it also emphasised the reforms put in place during the past 2 years, which covered the main areas of justice, freedom and security.
After it made the assessment of Montenegrin application, the European Commission gave a positive opinion of it on 9 November 2010. A month later, on 17 December, the European Council gave the candidate status to Montenegro. Thus, Montenegro became the fifth country to be recognised officially as a candidate country, joining Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia and Iceland. Croatia would become an EU member in 2013 and Iceland would suspend its application in the same year. During the Tito era, the Yugoslav 'red passport' provided visa-free travel to large number of countries -a contrast that made introduction of visa regime in the 1990s psychologically more difficult to accept. Cosmopolitanism and the legacies of Dissent, edited by T. Caraus and C. A. Parvu, New York and London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 52-53. Whilst the European Commission gave positive opinion on Montenegrin application, it still emphasized some key problems the country needed to face in order to start negotiations with the European Union. It was underlined that Montenegro needs to achieve the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria and in particular the Copenhagen political criteria requiring the stability of institutions guaranteeing notably the rule of law. These requirements are democratic institutions and processes; respect for human rights including minority rights; functioning open market economies; and the ability to adopt the Acquis Communautaire into national legislation, all of which are non-negotiable in terms of the EU accession.
17 Later, another criterion regarding the need of expansion of administrative structures for effective adoption of the acquis was added. It was introduced on Madrid European Council meeting in 1995, and thus it is called Madrid criterion. 18 The following were the particular priorities Montenegro had to work on: -Improving the legislative framework for elections in line with the recommendations of the OSCE-ODIHR and the Venice Commission and strengthen the Parliament's legislative and oversight role; -Completing essential steps in public administration reform, enhancing professionalism and de-politicisation of public administration and strengthening a transparent, merit-based approach to appointments and promotions (lack of administrative capacities and appointments and promotions based on party affiliation and/or family and friendly relations are seen as major problems for Montenegro on its path of European integrations. Nepotism is characteristic not only because it is common for smaller societies, such as Montenegrin, but also because in Montenegro tribal (clan) relations still exist as a remnant of centuries-long organisation amongst its villages); -Strengthening rule of law in particular through de-politicised and merit-based appointments of members of the judicial and prosecutorial councils and of state prosecutors as well as through reinforcement of the independence, autonomy, efficiency and accountability of judges and prosecutors (Even 3 years after this EU opinion, the country had a problem to elect Supreme State Prosecutor and the interregnum in that office lasted for more than a year); -Improving the anti-corruption legal framework, implementing the government's anti-corruption strategy and action plan and also establishing a solid track record Also, fighting organised crime, enhancing media freedom and implementing the legal and policy framework on anti-discrimination were cited.
After negotiations, talks were opened in June 2012, (currently, in August 2017, 28 out of 33/35 chapters are opened), the European Union maintained that considerable efforts would be needed to improve Montenegrin administrative and judicial capacities. The fields of trade, foreign policy and science, education and culture are not seen as problematic for Montenegro, as expected as it is a small country that has an open economy and no major foreign policy issues open. On the other hand, the most problematic field is environment. It is a bit of a paradox, since Montenegro declared itself the first ecological state in the world, 19 but the declaration remained a mere piece of paper. To align with the EU legislation in this field and to implement it effectively, the country needs to invest substantially. It also needs to strengthen administrative capacity for the enforcement of legislation in order to achieve compliance on the most important issues, including climate change, in the medium term, and in order to achieve full compliance with the acquis in the long term, it would necessitate even higher levels of investments. The need to strengthen administrative capacities for ensuring the application of the acquis remains even after years of negotiations a substantial challenge for Montenegro. Despite resistance from part of the opposition and the obvious fact that this decision deeply divides the country, the government decided to make decision in parliament, without any qualified majority, not on the referendum. On 28 April 2017, 46 out of 81 MPs backed NATO membership. That opens the possibility that theoretically some other government in the future can alter this decision by only a slim majority of MPs.
Montenegrin Government continuously emphasised its commitment to European and Western values, democracy, peace and stability as the main motives for pushing the country strongly towards NATO membership. However, behind Foreign Relations of Post-Independence Montenegro: A Change of Direction that idealistic cover up (not unseen in, e.g. the US foreign policy -did America excuse its actions across the Middle East on various occasions with its will to bring democracy to the region?), different motives lie. Whilst Montenegrin officials openly discuss the importance of NATO for defending Montenegrin national sovereignty, the real threats for its independence and territorial integrity are not mentioned. Reasons for that lie in the internal politics of Montenegro. Montenegrin ruling party is in coalition with minority parties, including Albanian and Bosniak parties. Thus, emphasising the threat of the Greater (or the so-called 'natural') Albania to Montenegrin territorial integrity would not be opportune. However, with the advancement of Albanian nationalism after partial recognition of Kosovo, and then taking a stronger role in Macedonia (after forming the government this year that significantly modified its foreign policy course), there is a possibility that Albanian minority of Montenegro may push stronger for some kind of autonomy. In 2006, just days before the parliamentary elections, a group of armed Albanians were arrested and accused of plotting terrorist attack (the so-called police action 'Eagle's Flight'). Whilst there was no military conflict between Albanians and Slavs in Montenegro, unlike Kosovo and Macedonia, there is a push for more autonomy, which was seen in ultimately successful request for the separation of Tuzi area into a separate municipality. That doesn't mean an ethnically based autonomy per se but may be a move towards just that. Turning ethnic divisions into political entities would be disastrous for Montenegro, as shown in Bosnian and Macedonian models. Also, whilst Muslims of Yugoslavia were amongst the most secular in the world, the process of islamisation, as it happens elsewhere, came to Montenegro as well. There are Montenegrin citizens amongst the fighters of the so-called Islamic State. Its two neighbours, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are amongst the top three countries regarding the number of ISIS foreign fighters per capita. 21 The return of foreign fighters to Montenegro, together with growing number of Wahhabi Muslims in the country, may present a significant threat to country's security. This threat is also not emphasised too much because of the kingmaker's role Bosniak (Montenegrin Muslims') party has in Montenegrin politics. Of course, large Serbian minority (not an ethnic one, but rather political, because Montenegrin Serbs do not originate from Serbia but they are Montenegrins who believe that there is no Montenegrin nation separate from the Serb one) may present a threat, but Serbia, despite its inner problems, chose pro-European course and even when its influence was much stronger (in the late 1990s and around the referendum in 2006) did not substantially jeopardised Montenegrin stability. This possible threat is, however, 21 'Balcani, tarlo per la sicurezza europea' Affari internazionali, 4 luglio 2017, http://www. affarinternazionali.it/2017/07/balcani-tarlo-la-sicurezza-europea/ 25/08/2017 more openly discussed, because Serbian parties do not take part in the coalition government. Of course, being in NATO offers protection from a full-scale attack but such attacks are hardly going to happen, and it is questionable what protection NATO would offer against other efforts at destabilisation.
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Apart from securing its integrity and peace, Montenegro sees NATO membership as an opportunity to achieve better position in the region. With the visit of Vice President Pence on 1-2 August 2017, it looked like it already made improvement -all leaders of post-Yugoslav countries came to Podgorica to meet him, thus making, at least for a day, Montenegrin capital a diplomatic centre of the region, something it never was. However, whilst certain improvement can be expected, it is unlikely that Montenegro has a potential to become a regional leader -despite some seemingly out of place and too optimistic forecasts. 23 It is the smallest country in the region by population, second smallest by territory; its economy and geographic position also do not make it a natural leader in the region.
Speaking about the challenges, Montenegro has a very small (less than 3,000) professional army that already has experience in NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, so potential involvement in future conflicts would not make an important challenge. NATO membership, of course, has its price, and it may present a problem for the small (and indebted) Montenegrin budget to fulfil its obligation as a member, the problem much bigger economies also face as it could be witnessed. Further complication of international relations amongst the important players may also complicate Montenegrin stability. It is very important that tensions between NATO and Russia do not continue to grow and also that possible fallout amongst Turkey and the Western NATO members is avoided. It may be difficult to continuously follow major NATO countries in a conflict whilst still a significant part of Montenegrin population expresses Russophile views, or when large Muslim minority expresses strong sympathies and ties with Turkey. Political and ethnic divisions in Montenegro remain a major obstacle. 
Bilateral relations

Montenegro and its neighbours
Relations between Montenegro and its neighbours are interconnected with its European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, because the process of improvement of inter-Balkan relations has been strongly encouraged by the European Union and NATO. It is also influenced by its relations with the great and regional powers, because of, for example, strong relations that Turkey has with Bosnia and Herzegovina or still strong ties between Serbia and Russia.
Montenegro remains the only ex-Yugoslav republic that did not suffer an inter-ethnic armed conflict. However, its role in the wars in the 1990s in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the Dubrovnik operation, still brings certain burden to its relations with these two countries. The tensions that were characteristic for the independence referendum period (and particularly, during the term of Serbian nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, 2004 Kostunica, -2008 are mostly gone to the extent that Montenegrin PM Milo Djukanovic said in October 2016 that 'with the exception of Yugoslav era, relations between Serbia and Montenegro had never been better', 24 which is reasserted by his successor, Duško Marković, who said on his first meeting with his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vučić that 'relations between Montenegro and Serbia are best in last twenty years'. 25 However, whilst the cooperation between the two governments is close, certain problems do appear, particularly regarding interpretations of history, religious, linguistic and other issues derived from building of the new identity of Montenegro.
Serbia remains the most important trade partner of Montenegro, with goods worth of 558.6 million euros imported in Montenegro in 2015 (but only 49.6 million exported to Serbia, which emphasises a huge trade deficit of Montenegrin economy). As tourism is an important part of Montenegrin economy, an important part of relations between two countries is also the relation in tourism, with Serbian tourists being either first or second (behind Russians) foreign tourists in Montenegro. Serbs, with tourists from Bosnia and Herzegovina coming in third place, again emphasising the economic relations between the West Balkans nations. Cultural relations, because of the same heritage, many years of common history in Yugoslavia and the same or mutually intelligible languages, also play an important part in the region. However, whilst various films, singers, sport clubs or TV personalities from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and even Macedonia are popular in Montenegro, it is hardly the opposite. Thus, tourist destinations, such as Kotor Bay, Budva and Ulcinj on the coast, the old capital of Cetinje and mountain resorts in the north of the country, remain the main brands Montenegro uses in its promotion abroad. Relations with Croatia continue to improve, although the Prevlaka peninsula issue (regarding determination of the border between the two) is a potential problem, particularly if we are aware of the difficulties Croatia faced with Slovenia regarding somewhat similar problems. However, Montenegrin then-President Djukanovic made a great and important step when he visited Dubrovnik in 2000 (that was under siege of Montenegrin and Serbian forces in 1991, then supported amongst others by Djukanovic, at the time prime minister), recognised the mistakes of Montenegrin policy in the early 1990s and apologised. 26 That started a new era of relations between the two countries that continues to this day.
Unlike Serbs and Macedonians, Montenegrins maintained stable inter-ethnic relations with the Albanian minority, and that mirrors on relations of Montenegro with Albania. Whilst economic relations are not as close with other neighbours, political relations remain excellent -the first official visit of the new Montenegrin Foreign Minister Srdjan Darmanovic was to Tirana, and the Albanian PM Edi Rama said in his recent (April 2017) visit to Montenegro that 'in Montenegro he feels like home' 27 , also emphasising the role Albanian minority in Montenegro has had in the country's independence referendum, and also NATO and the EU integration processes. Certain disagreements with Kosovo, regarding the final establishment of borders between Montenegro and Kosovo, however, point to potential problems in the future with proponents of 'natural Albania' project (which includes parts of Montenegro), as mentioned before. Montenegro recognised Kosovo just a few months after its independence proclamation in 2008, widely believed to be a product of Western pressure and against the Montenegrin public opinion. That temporarily damaged its relations with Serbia and sparked protests in Montenegro.
Foreign Relations of Post-Independence Montenegro: A Change of Direction
Overall, after a long period of conflicts, the countries of the Western Balkans now cooperate through various regional initiatives (such as CEFTA, AdriaticIonian Initiative, Central European Initiative and Southeast European Cooperative Initiative) in order to improve their mutual ties and build peace.
28 Montenegro tries to strongly emphasise its stable relations with the neighbouring countries, particularly with Croatia and Albania -that underlines the change of its foreign policy direction from the late 1980s and 1990s when it sided with Serbia in its conflicts.
The long and complex relations with Russia
Russia and Montenegro have a long history of close cooperation. Ever since Russian Emperor Peter I sent the letter to Montenegrins asking them to join Russians in fight against the Ottoman Empire in 1711, Montenegro had been the pro-Russian bastion in the Balkans. Whilst other larger countries, such as Bulgaria and Serbia, competed for Russian support and, from time to time fell in and out of its favour, Montenegro was the entire time reliable Russian ally. Montenegrins and Russians share the same Slavic roots and have related languages, and majority of Montenegrins, like the most of Russians, belong to Orthodox Christian tradition. Montenegro was still unrecognised by most of the great powers and led the neverending struggle against the Ottoman Empire with Russian financial and sometime diplomatic support. Thus the myth of invincible little mountainous tribe supported only by the distant mother Russia was introduced.
For Russia, Montenegro was first of all a satellite statelet that was able to make diversion in the Balkans whilst Russia fights the Turks on the Black Sea or in the Caucasus. Whilst giving a toast to Montenegrin Prince Nicholas on the occasion of his official visit, Emperor Alexander III said that Montenegro was the only true friend that Russia had. During the course of 20th century, relations between Yugoslavia, whose part Montenegro forcibly became in 1918, and the Soviet Union had their ups and downs, but even when newly socialist Yugoslavia broke up with Stalin in 1948, most of those who opposed it were from Montenegro. Tito from Yugoslavia became one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement that strongly emphasised its independence from the Soviet Union. When Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991 and Montenegrin regime decided that the country should stay in the union with Serbia, Russia did not play a significant role in the Balkans because of its own problems derived from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many pro-Serbian Montenegrins hoped that Russia would be back on its feet soon and would help them against what they saw as the (US-led) international community of the new world order. However, in 1997, Montenegrin leadership, after the ruling party split, decided to start orienting towards the West and, gradually, in favour of the nation's independence. Whilst some would expect that Russia would not rush because of its closeness with Serbia, it became the first amongst the great powers to recognise the independence of Montenegro after the referendum in 2006. PM Djukanovic visited Putin in Sochi soon after. After that, Russian investors literally overrun Montenegro. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, valued Russian investments in Montenegro at about $2 billion, roughly equivalent to Montenegro's annual economic output. 29 Close economic ties were particularly emphasised in the field of tourism were Russian market became the most important for Montenegrin tourism. For example, according to Montenegrin Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism, in 2013, tourists from Russia made up 28.1% of all foreign tourists who visited the country, and they stayed on an average 8 days, more than the other tourists. Signs of close relations with Russia were everywhere -central pedestrian bridge in Podgorica was built as the gift from Moscow and was named Moscow Bridge. Monument to Pushkin was unveiled in front of the Constitutional Court, whilst monument to Vladimir Vysotsky was built in the park in front of the Ministry of Defence.
Montenegrin foreign policy did not overemphasise its commitment towards Euro Atlantic integration, whilst it was still a distant possibility, in order to continue good relations with Russia. However, since 1997, the process of detachment of Montenegro from the 'East' has already begun. Thus, from this perspective, with Montenegro in NATO and its relations with Russia damaged, it looks that the process of realignment of Montenegro started already in the late 1990s, not in the early 2010s, when results of this change only became finally palpable. Even as late as 2013, there were talks (made public by the US Senator Christopher Murphy) that Russia offered Montenegro several billion dollars to let it build a naval base. Montenegrin Government allegedly waited too long before finally declining the offer, making NATO concerned of the Russian influence and Montenegrin indecisiveness. This story, whilst obviously dismissed by both sides, 30 even late in the process of achieving NATO membership, there was still a strong involvement of Russian influence in Montenegrin decision-making structures.
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The reasons for decisions of Montenegrin Government regarding NATO were already discussed, but here we can say that, in respect of Russia, they were not products of Russia policy toward Montenegro. Russia became openly aggressive (and then also, mostly rhetorically till 2016) only as a reaction to Montenegrin decision. This decision was based on the reality of contemporary geopolitics. If Russia would be seen as strong enough to guarantee Montenegro security and if it had some alliance on a par with the European Union as a carrot to offer, there might have been another story. But because it is not the case, the facts, not some elusive values, were decisive in Montenegrin alignment with the West.
The alleged attempted coup d'état in Montenegro on the election day, 16 October 2016, will not be discussed here because the judicial process is still on-going, and it is hard to measure possible Russian role in it (there are even ideas of the Montenegrin ruling party making it up in order to get stronger Western support to cling to power). However, the mere fact that it is possible to believe that Russia would and could do that is indicating how low the relations between the two former allies got.
Although Russia did not succeed to stop Montenegro joining NATO, it will most probably remain influential in Montenegro. As Serbia remains the most important and centrally located country of the Western Balkans, Russian involvement in Montenegrin politics was probably more of a signal to Serbian government than a viable attempt to stop a process that was nearing its end. Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić visited Moscow only 6 days before his victory in the first round of the presidential election on 2 April 2017. It is to expect that he will continue to push for Serbia joining the European Union but, at the same time, without NATO membership as a goal for time being and with close military and economic ties with Russia. As Serbia is politically, economically and culturally, despite all the differences and political conflicts of the previous two decades, the most important Montenegrin neighbour, the Russian presence in Montenegro will remain, at least through the pro-Serbian opposition parties. 
Montenegro-United States relations
As the influence of Russia grows, the American involvement in the Southeastern Europe follows. Since Great Britain announced it is unable to cope with communist insurgencies in Greece and potentially in Turkey, the United States, through Truman doctrine, started it greater presence in the Balkans -the presence it have maintained, more or less visible, up until now. So, it can be said that assertive Russia means strong interest of American foreign policy in the Balkans, including Montenegro, and weaker and withdrawn Russia, as it was, for example, through most of the 1990s means less of an American presence there. When Yugoslav wars started, the administration of George W. H. Bush concluded that the United States had 'no dog in that fight' because the Soviet Union was coming to its end and Europe was apparently growing stronger.
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Montenegro during most of the 1990s followed Serbia loyally and thus the United States was regarded as an adversary who wanted to use the collapse of the Soviet Union to rule the world. By Serbian politicians, academics and media (followed, though on a somewhat lesser scale by their counterparts in Montenegro), the United States was accused of running anti-Serb crusade and grouping together unlikely partners such as Iran, CIA and Vatican was a common thing even amongst Serbian and pro-Serbian intellectuals. As FRY suffered isolation, the major country accused for that happening was the United States and the new world order was the term used mostly pejoratively. However, during the second half of the 1990s, Montenegrin government started turning away from Serbia and that influenced its politics towards the United States and its perception of American foreign policy. On the other hand, the United States saw its importance in conflict with Milosevic and Montenegro became the second largest per capita recipient of the US aid.
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Montenegro opened its trade mission in Washington in 1996, signalling its will to achieve closer relations with the United States and also pointing toward more independent foreign policy. Still a divided country, for many people and for the major opposition parties, America remained an evil empire, and it was showed particularly during the NATO intervention in spring 1999 when protest was held in front of the American Centre in Podgorica. Echoes of those events are still present on the political scene of the country and in its public and media, although on a much lesser scale. Open anti-Americanism, at least tolerated, if not openly supported in the 1990s, after regaining Montenegrin independence in 2006 is only rarely and sporadically seen. Still, although only some extremist (but mostly extra-parliamentary) political subjects use anti-American rhetoric, what used to be anti-Americanism is now channelled through anti-NATO, particularly focused on the opposition to Montenegrin membership in NATO. Opposition to NATO is usually, but not always, followed by the support of closer relations with Russia, which proves that long history of aligning with that country still has an impact on Montenegrin politics and public life. Public polling on ethnic distance in Montenegro done in December 2013 showed that the distance expressed by Montenegrin population towards Americans is only in 2% or 3% range from other larger nations, including French and Russians, and much smaller than distance expressed towards Roma population, Albanians and Croats.
Two main interests of the US foreign policy in Montenegro in this decade are seen: (1) maintaining stability in the country and diminishing the possibility of spill over of any tension to neighbouring countries and (2) bringing the country into NATO thus closing the possibility of Russian influence finding its way onto Mediterranean, achieved in June 2017. Both interests are shared with Montenegrin government.
However, whilst exactly not a 'Balkan mouse', 34 Montenegro doesn't present important country for the United States in regard of economy and security. The United States-Montenegro trade in goods fall from around 50 million $ worth in the late 2000s to less than 20 million per year in this decade, which is very modest. 35 The country has a very small military force (projected number of soldiers is just above 2,000), modest fleet and no aviation. Montenegro does not have a large diaspora in the United States. It is an important tourist destination, but the tourists are usually coming from Eastern European and Balkan countries, followed by Western and Northern Europe and rarely from North America.
However, despite its size, it is more significant for the US foreign policy than other countries of roughly the same size, such as Solomon Islands or Bhutan. Its place on the maps of American foreign policy is shaped by geopolitics and by regional dynamics, not by its size, economy or strictly military reasons. America's bilateral aid to Montenegro in past decade is more than 200 million dollars and counting. The United States supports strengthening of democratic structures in Montenegro through media training programmes, helps building social and intellectual foundations to democracy through grants to Montenegrin non-governmental organisations, supports other projects to raise civic awareness, develops leadership skills, particularly amongst Montenegrin youth, and is training, mentoring and giving Montenegrin police, military and custom officials technical assistance. Montenegrin leaders -prime minister, president, parliament speaker, foreign minister and defence minister -and also opposition leaders regularly visit the United States and meet its officials. However, the lack of visits of American officials to Montenegro remained visible. Apart from visit of then-Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, none of the high officials visited the country. Hillary Clinton visited the region various times but she skipped only Montenegro and Macedonia, although, for example, she had two official trips to Serbia in only 2 years time after Joe Biden visited Serbia. For some, the speech made by former president Bill Clinton made in Budva was telling of importance, respect and perception of American officials of Montenegro. Clinton said that he was happy to be in Macedonia -some said he was just tired and that day was too sunny -but for many it was a sign that even the American politician who dealt with the region more than anyone before or after him could not distinguish even basic things in the region his administration's actions so much influenced. Finally, the visit of the US Vice President Mike Pence in August 2017, his first visit to the region, may show that Montenegro becomes more important for the American foreign policy, but it remains to be seen how important this 'historic visit' 36 (less than 24 h long) would be.
There is convergence of Montenegrin and American interests regarding many issues. It is the US interest that previously unstable region of Balkans remains stable and preserves peace. This is also very important for Montenegro -whilst it does not look as highly possible that Montenegro itself would become a source of regional instability, there is always present the scare of returning to 1990s situation when, although out of war area, Montenegro suffered economically and politically and is still making a recovery. Also, it is the US interest to have Balkan countries on its side. Balkan region, although less strategically important now than it used to be, remains the nearest part of Europe to Asia, and further on, the Middle East, and also it remains the area of interest for Russia. So both countries share common interest that, at certain point in the future, all Western Balkan countries, including Serbia, would be aligned with the United States through NATO.
The government, trying to achieve stability, will most probably continue to follow instructions from the West, first of all America, probably faster and without much analysing -we should mention that Montenegro quickly supported possible intervention in Syria years ago, before most of American allies confronted that idea.
World is full of security threats and the United States is seen as the most powerful country and the only possible guarantor of Montenegrin security in the still fragile region. That, and not some elusive affinities of values and cultures, as mentioned before, is the main force that drags Montenegro away from the Russian camp, into the Western one. From Montenegrin perspective, it is not idealised as a leader of the free and democratic world, but respected, and sometimes admired for its strength and the way it has been assuring security to its allies. It is the position held by many of those who support NATO membership, including part of Montenegrin political elite. They are not idealists who admire the United States for its genuine values -they are realists who want to find the best possible solution for their country's problems. Whilst many do not like American post-Cold War unipolarism, and, personally, may even grow more sympathies for American rivals, they still see partnership with the United States as the only viable solution for the time being. Some aspects of American culture, such as films, music and food, can be embraced, but prejudices about Americans such as being ignorant, uneducated and disinterested for the rest of the world, or at least too insular, are still widely present.
Overall, we can say that political elite would probably follow most of the other smaller European countries and would move Montenegro closer to the United States. The population itself would remain divided whilst pro-Russian (and thus anti-American) bias may be diminishing in the long run.
Other players -China and Turkey
When Montenegro became independent, it developed relations with many countries, and whilst its European integration and its economic ties with Russia were central, it also started forging stronger relations with countries such as Turkey, China and some Arab countries. 37 The Balkan countries, including Montenegro, were well suited to exploit extra-EU markets, including bringing important investors and trade partners from Russia and the economically expending Turkey and also Chinese banks and companies that are building roads, railways and other infrastructure projects in the region.
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Montenegro maintains strong economic ties with China. China is amongst the top three import partners of Montenegro. The ships of the new Montenegrin trade fleet were built in Shanghai, and China Road and Bridge Corporation builds the first highway in Montenegro that will connect the capital city with the mountainous region in the north -a project worth almost one billion dollars. 39 That way China solidifies its presence in Montenegro the same way it does in other countries in the region. In Serbia, they also took large projects such as the Pupin Bridge on Danube in Belgrade and railway reconstruction. In Greece, The China Ocean Shipping Company (Cosco) took over 51% of the Greek state-owned Piraeus Port Authority in August 2016. 40 Montenegro is aware of growing importance of China in international relations, and one of only five embassies Montenegro opened out of Europe is in Beijing -other four are in New York, Washington, Buenos Aires (because of large Montenegrin diaspora in Argentina) and Abu Dhabi (because of business relations with the UAE).
Whilst, as mentioned earlier, assertive Russia provokes stronger Western involvement in the Balkans, it has not yet been the case with Chinese growing involvement in the region. China does represent a stronger threat to global US interests than Russia, but in the Balkan region, it doesn't have means and interests, at least at the moment, to involve into foreign policy of the Balkan nations, continuing pursuing its economic interests. Its involvement in the East Asia and the Western Pacific, where it has naturally stronger interests causes US concerns, but in the Balkans the geographic distance, lack of cultural similarities and historic ties make it, for time being a lesser threat, thus making Montenegrin economic affairs with China easier. 37 at the same time, its alignment with the Western countries was used by the ruling elite to slow down the reforms of the country that has no democratic tradition into a true liberal democracy. Montenegro still has many issues to solve, such as extreme economic inequality, widespread corruption, a lack of social and legal responsibility of officials in the country where one party (that changed the name in 1991) has ruled for more than 70 years uninterrupted and also identity issues, very sensitive in the only European country without an ethnic majority (Montenegrins being only 45% of the country's population).
Whilst Montenegro remained much more stable than its neighbours (which was not that difficult to achieve because almost all countries in the region faced internal armed conflicts or full scale wars), the main problem of its foreign policy implementation is its internal politics. The deep gap between the opposition and the governing coalition is only emphasised once again after the parliamentary election on October 2016, which was narrowly won by the governing party and its minority partners. The results are not accepted by the opposition that remains (whilst ideologically divided) united in its boycott of parliament. The judicial process against some of the (pro-Russian part of ) opposition for alleged involvement in the coup d'etat on the election day only adds to the tension.
It appears that there is still a long way towards Western standards for Montenegro. From this perspective, it looks hard to conceive the country that had never overseen democratic succession of political parties in power joins the European Union, but it is as hard to imagine wrapping up its European integration with the anti-NATO Democratic Front at helm.
Many positive changes came only as the result of foreign pressure, but behind the reforms, there still lies a Balkan baggage. The symbolic example for it was the celebration of NATO invitation at the Montenegrin Atlantic Council. The Council was enthusiastic about Montenegro finally becoming part of the Western Europe. At the same time, they celebrated it with, not music by Mendelssohn or Handel, but typically Balkan trumpet players.
Still Montenegrin foreign policy has seen huge changes in the past two decades, since the country started the turnover from pro-Serbian and pro-Russian historic ties into strongly pro-Western ones, which culminated after achieving the independence. It mustn't be forgotten that these changes are less of results of an evolution and more the opportunistic adjustment following the contemporary regional and world power play. The certain need for balanced foreign policy will remain, and a good example of balanced foreign policy, in the limits of NATO and EU membership, may be Slovenia and its dealings with Russia since the introduction of the EU sanctions. However, even when the change of government in Montenegro comes, the experiences of other countries in the region, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, showed that despite pro-Russian rhetoric in the campaign, even more conservative forces become much more pragmatic when they come to power. Its NATO (and maybe the EU membership, projected for the 2020s) will most probably anchor it in the Western club, and its military and political small size will prevent it from being any kind of potential 'Trojan Horse' of Russia in the Western camp.
